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Abstract
We study the asymptotic behavior of the difference ∆ρX,Yα := ρα(X +Y )− ρα(X) as
α→ 1, where ρα is a risk measure equipped with a confidence level parameter 0 < α < 1,
and where X and Y are non-negative random variables whose tail probability functions
are regularly varying. The case where ρα is the value-at-risk (VaR) at α, is treated in [20].
This paper investigates the case where ρα is a spectral risk measure that converges to
the worst-case risk measure as α→ 1. We give the asymptotic behavior of the difference
between the marginal risk contribution and the Euler contribution of Y to the portfolio
X + Y . Similarly to [20], our results depend primarily on the relative magnitudes of the
thicknesses of the tails of X and Y . We also conducted a numerical experiment, finding
that when the tail of X is sufficiently thicker than that of Y , ∆ρX,Yα does not increase
monotonically with α and takes a maximum at a confidence level strictly less than 1.
Keywords: Spectral risk measures, quantitative risk management, asymptotic anal-
ysis, extreme value theory, Euler contribution
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the asymptotic behavior of the difference
∆ρX,Yα := ρα(X + Y )− ρα(X) (1.1)
as α → 1, where X and Y are fat-tailed random variables (loss variables) and (ρα)0<α<1 is a
family of risk measures. The case where ρα is an α-percentile value-at-risk (VaR), has been
treated in [20], where it was shown that the asymptotic behavior of ∆VaRX,Yα drastically
changes according to the relative magnitudes of the thicknesses of the tails of X and Y
(the definition of the VaR is given in (2.1) in the next section). In this paper, we study a
progressive case in which ρα is given as a parameterized spectral risk measure, and we obtain
similar results as in [20]. In particular, we find that if X and Y are independent and if the tail
of X is sufficiently fatter than that of Y , then ∆ρX,Yα converges to the expected value E[Y ]
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as α → 1 whenever (ρα)0<α<1 are spectral risk measures converging to a risk measure of the
worst case scenario. That is, whenever
ρα(Z) −→
α→1
ess sup
ω
Z(ω) (1.2)
for each loss random variable Z in some sense. Our result does not require any specific form for
ρα, implying that this property is robust. Furthermore, assuming some technical conditions
for the probability density functions of X and Y , we study the asymptotic behavior of the
Euler contribution, defined as
ρEulerα (Y |X + Y ) =
∂
∂h
ρα(X + hY )
∣∣∣
h=1
(1.3)
(see Remark 17.1 in [29]), and show that ∆ρX,Yα is asymptotically equivalent to δρ
Euler
α (Y |X+Y )
as α → 1. Here, δ ∈ (0, 1] is a constant determined according to the relative magnitudes of
the thicknesses of the tails of X and Y .
We now briefly review the financial background for this study. In quantitative financial
risk management, it is important to capture tail loss events by using adequate risk measures.
One of the most standard risk measures is the VaR. The Basel Accords, which provide a set of
recommendations for regulations in the banking industry, essentially recommend using VaR as
a measure of risk capital for banks. VaRs are indeed simple, useful, and their values are easy
to interpret. For instance, a yearly 99.9% VaR calculated as x0 means that the probability
of a risk event with a realized loss larger than x0 is 0.1%. In other words, an amount x0
of risk capital is sufficient to prevent a default with 99.9% probability. The meaning of the
amount x0 is therefore easy to understand. However, VaRs are often criticized for their lack
of subadditivity (see, for instance, [2,4,15]). VaRs do not reflect the risk diversification effect.
The expected shortfall (ES) has been proposed as an alternative risk measure that is
coherent (in particular, subadditive) and tractable, with the risk amount at least that of the
corresponding VaR. Note that there are various versions of ES, such as the conditional value-
at-risk (CVaR), the average value-at-risk (AVaR), the tail conditional expectation (TCE),
and the worst conditional expectation (WCE). These are all equivalent under some natural
assumptions (see [3–6]). It should be noted that the Basel Accords have also considered
recently the adoption of ESs as a minimal capital requirement, in order to better capture
market tail risks (see for instance [7, 8]).
A spectral risk measure (SRM) has been proposed as a generalization of ESs, in [2]. SRMs
are characterized by a weight function φ that represents the significance of each confidence
level for the risk manager. SRMs are equivalent to comonotonic law-invariant coherent risk
measures (see Remark 1 in the next section).
VaRs and ESs as risk measures depend on a confidence level parameter α ∈ (0, 1). We
let VaRα (resp., ESα) denote the VaR (resp., ES) with confidence level α. When α is close
to 1, the values of VaRα and ESα are increasing without bound as in (1.2). The parameter
α corresponds to the risk aversion level of the risk manager. Higher values of α indicate that
the risk manager is more risk-averse and evaluates the tail risk as more severe.
In this paper, we consider a family (ρα)0<α<1 of SRMs parameterized by the confidence level
α. we make a mathematical assumption that intuitively implies situation (1.2) and investigate
the asymptotic behaviors of (1.1) and (1.3) as α→ 1, when the tail probability function of X
2
(resp., Y ) is regularly varying with index −β (resp., −γ). Our main theorem asserts that the
asymptotic behaviors of (1.1) and (1.3) strongly depend on the relative magnitudes of β and
γ. Note that our results include the case ρα = ESα, the inclusion of which was discussed as a
future task in [20].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we prepare the basic settings
and introduce the definitions for SRMs based on confidence level. In Section 3, we give our
main results. We numerically verify our results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our
studies. Throughout the main part of this paper, we assume that X and Y are independent.
The more general case where X and Y are not independent is studied in Appendix A. All
proofs are given in Appendix B.
2 Preliminaries
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a standard probability space and let L+ denote a set of non-negative
random variables defined on (Ω,F , P ). For each Z ∈ L+, we denote by FZ the distribution
function of Z and by F¯Z its tail probability function; that is, FZ(z) = P (Z ≤ z) and F¯Z(z) =
P (Z > z). Moreover, for each α ∈ (0, 1), we define
VaRα(Z) = inf{z ∈ R ; P (Z ≤ z) ≥ α}. (2.1)
Note that VaRα(Z) is exactly the left-continuous version of the generalized inverse function
of FZ .
We now introduce the definition of SRMs.
Definition 1.
(i) A Borel measurable function φ : [0, 1) −→ [0,∞) is called an admissible spectrum if φ is
right-continuous, non-decreasing, and satisfies∫ 1
0
φ(α)dα = 1. (2.2)
(ii) A risk measure ρ : L+ −→ [0,∞) is called an SRM if there is an admissible spectrum φ
such that ρ = Mφ, where
Mφ(Z) =
∫ 1
0
VaRα(Z)φ(α)dα, Z ∈ L+.
Remark 1. SRMs are law-invariant, comonotonic, and coherent risk measures. However, as
shown in [17, 18, 21], if (Ω,F , P ) is atomless, then for any law-invariant comonotonic convex
risk measure ρ, there is a probability measure µ on [0, 1] such that
ρ(Z) =
∫ 1
0
ESα(Z)µ(dα), (2.3)
for each Z ∈ L∞(Ω,F , P ). This is due to the generalized Kusuoka representation theorem
(Theorem 4.93 in [17]), where ESα(Z) is the α-percentile expected shortfall of Z:
ESα(Z) =
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
VaRu(Z)du. (2.4)
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Moreover, such a ρ is always coherent and satisfies the Fatou property [18]. Furthermore,
representation (2.3) can also be rewritten as ρ(Z) = Mφµ(Z), where
φµ(α) =
∫ 1
0
1
1− u1[0,α](u)µ(du).
Here, it is easy to see that φµ is non-negative, non-decreasing, right-continunous, and satisfies∫ 1
0
φµ(α)dα =
∫ 1
0
1
1− u
∫ 1
0
1{0≤u≤α}dαµ(du) = 1,
meaning that φµ is an admissible spectrum (see [25]). Therefore, any law-invariant comono-
tonic convex (or coherent) risk measure is completely characterized as an SRM. Arguments
similar to those above, replacing L∞(Ω,F , P ) with Lp(Ω,F , P ), where 1 ≤ p < ∞, can be
found in [23,25].
Next, we introduce a family (ρα)0<α<1 of SRMs parameterized by the confidence level α.
Definition 2. Let (φα)0<α<1 be a familly of admissible spectra and let ρα = Mφα. Then
(ρα)0<α<1 is called a set of confidence-level-based spectral risk measures (CLBSRMs) if
Φα −→w δ1, α→ 1, (2.5)
where Φα is a probability measure on [0, 1] defined by Φα(du) = φα(u)du and δ1 is the Dirac
measure with unit mass at 1.
Condition (2.5) formally implies (1.2). Indeed, if Z ∈ L+ is a bounded random variable
with a distribution function that is continuous and strictly increasing on [0, z∗], where z∗ =
esssup
ω
Z(ω), then the function u 7→ VaRu(Z) is bounded and continuous, so that (2.5) gives
ρα(Z) =
∫ 1
0
VaRu(Z)Φα(du) −→ z∗, α→ 1,
where we recognize VaR1(Z) = F
−1
Z (1) = z
∗. Moreover, we see that
Lemma 1. Relation (2.5) is equivalent to
φα(u) −→ 0, α→ 1 for each u ∈ [0, 1). (2.6)
We now give some examples of CLBSRMs.
Example 1. Expected Shortfalls
(ESα)0<α<1 defined by (2.4) is a typical example of a CLBSRM. The corresponding admis-
sible spectra are given as
φESα (u) =
1
1− α1[α,1)(u).
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It is easy to see that (2.5) does hold. Indeed, for any bounded continuous function f defined
on [0, 1], we see that
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
f(u)du =
∫ 1
0
f(u+ α(1− u))du −→ f(1), α→ 1
due to the bounded convergence theorem. Equivalently, we can also check that (ESα)α satisfies
(2.6).
ESα is characterized as the smallest law-invariant coherent risk measures that are greater
than or equal to VaRα [21]. Note that if the distribution function of the target random variable
Z is continuous, then ESα(Z) coincides with CVaRα(Z), where
CVaRα(Z) = E[Z | Z ≥ VaRα(Z)]
(see [5] for details).
Example 2. Exponential/Power SRMs
An admissible spectrum φ corresponding to an SRM Mφ represents the preferences of a risk
manager for each quantile of the loss distribution. Therefore, the form taken by φ corresponds
to the manager’s risk aversion, which is also described in terms of utility functions in classical
decision theory. Recently, the relation between expected utility functions and SRMs has been
studied, though it has not been entirely resolved. Here we introduce some examples of SRMs
based on specific utility functions.
The exponential utility function is a typical example of tractable utility functions
Uγ(p) = −e
−γp
γ
,
where p denotes the profit-and-loss (p > 0 indicating profit) and γ characterizes the degree
of risk preference. We focus on the case 0 < γ < ∞ so that Uγ describes a risk-averse
utility function. We transform the parameter γ into the confidence level α ∈ (0, 1) using
α = (2/pi) tan−1 γ. Note that the original parameter γ can be recovered using the inverse
γ = tα := tan(piα/2). The exponential utility of the loss l with confidence level α is then given
as Utα(−l) = −eltα/tα. Cotter and Dowd [12] have proposed an SRM ρEXPα = MφEXPα based
on the exponential utility by constructing an admissible spectrum φEXPα (u) = −λUtα(−u) for
some λ > 0, so that φEXPα (u) satisfies (2.2). Then, λ must be set as t
2
α/(e
tα − 1), giving
φEXPα (u) =
tαe
−tα(1−u)
1− e−tα .
Note that the theoretical validity of the above method is still unclear. Other methods to
adequately construct SRMs from exponential utility functions have been discussed in [11, 26,
30], but no definite answer has been reached. In particular, it is pointed out in [11] that there
exists no general consistency between expected utility theory and SRM-decision making. In
any case, we can easily verify that (φEXPα )α as defined above satisfies (2.5)–(2.6), which implies
that (ρEXPα )α is actually a CLBSRM.
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Similarly to the above, an SRM ρPOWα = MφPOWα based on the power utility function
has been studied in [14]. After changing the risk aversion parameter to the confidence level
α ∈ (0, 1) as above, φPOWα is given as
φPOWα (u) =
uα/(1−α)
1− α .
We can also verify that (ρPOWα )0<α<1 is a CLBSRM.
We now introduce some notations and definitions used in asymptotic analysis and extreme
value theory.
Let f and g be positive functions defined on [x0, x1), where x0 ∈ [0,∞) and x1 ∈ (x0,∞].
We say that f and g are asymptotically equivalent (denoted as f ∼ g) as x → x1 if
lim
x→x1
f(x)/g(x) = 1. When x1 = ∞, we say that f is regularly varying with index k ∈ R
if it holds that lim
x→∞
f(tx)/f(x) = tk for each t > 0. Moreover, we say that f is ultimately
decreasing if f is non-increasing on [x2,∞) for some x2 > 0. For more details, we refer the
reader to [10,16].
3 Main results
Our main purpose is to investigate the property of (1.1) for a CLBSRM (ρα)0<α<1 and
random variables X, Y ∈ L+ whose distributions are fat-tailed. To consider this case, we
assume that F¯X and F¯Y are regularly varying functions with indices −β and −γ, respectively.
That is, F¯X(x), F¯Y (x) > 0 for each x ≥ 0 and
lim
x→∞
F¯X(tx)
F¯X(x)
= t−β, lim
x→∞
F¯Y (tx)
F¯Y (x)
= t−γ, t > 0 (3.1)
for some β, γ > 0.
In [20], we study the asymptotic property of (1.1) as α→ 1 when ρα = VaRα. The results
display the following five patterns: (i) β + 1 < γ, (ii) β < γ ≤ β + 1, (iii) β = γ, (iv)
γ < β ≤ γ + 1, and (v) γ + 1 < β. In cases (iv) and (v), we consider the difference ∆VaRY,Xα
instead of ∆VaRX,Yα , and the results are restated consequences of cases (i) and (ii). Hence,
we assume here that β ≤ γ and focus on cases (i)–(iii) only. We further assume that β > 1.
This assumption guarantees the integrability of X and Y (see, for instance, Proposition A3.8
in [16]).
Let (ρα)0<α<1 be a CLBSRM with a family of admissible spectra (φα)0<α<1. Here we
assume that
φα(1−) = lim
u→1
φα(u) <∞ (3.2)
for each α ∈ (0, 1). Then, Lemma A.23 in [17] implies that
ρα(X + Y ) ≤ φα(1−)
∫ 1
0
VaRu(X + Y )du = φα(1−)(E[X] + E[Y ]) <∞
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for each 0 < α < 1. This immediately implies that ρα(X), ρα(Y ) < ∞. Furthermore, by
(17.9b) and Proposition 17.2 in [29], we see that
∆ρX,Yα ≤ ρEulerα (Y |X + Y ) ≤ ρα(Y ), (3.3)
where ρEuler(Y |X+Y ) is given by (1.3) if ρα(X+hY ) is continuously differentiable in h. Note
that inequality (3.3) holds for each 0 < α < 1 whenever ρα is coherent.
Our main purpose in this section is to investigate in detail the asymptotic behavior of
∆ρX,Yα , as well as ρ
Euler
α (Y |X + Y ) if it is defined, as α→ 1. To clearly state our main results,
we establish the following conditions, which are assumed to hold in Section 4 of [20].
[C1] X and Y are independent.
[C2] There is some x0 ≥ 0 such that FX has a positive, non-increasing density function fX
on [x0,∞); that is, FX(x) = FX(x0) +
∫ x
x0
fX(y)dy, x ≥ x0.
[C3] The function xγ−βF¯Y (x)/F¯X(x) converges to some real number k as x→∞.
Let us adopt the notation
M¯(α) =

E[Y ] if β + 1 < γ,
k
β
∫ 1
0
VaRu(X)
β+1−γφα(u)du if β < γ ≤ β + 1,
{(1 + k)1/β − 1}ρα(X) if β = γ
(3.4)
for 0 < α < 1. Note that M¯(α) is finite for each fixed α ∈ (0, 1) (see Corollary 1 in Appendix
B). Our main results are the two following theorems.
Theorem 1. Assuming [C1]–[C3], ∆ρX,Yα ∼ M¯(α) as α→ 1.
Formally, assertions (i)–(iii) of Theorem 4.1 in [20] are the same as the assumptions of
Theorem 1, by setting Φα = δα. That is, we have ∆VaR
X,Y
α ∼ f¯(α) as α→ 1, where
f¯(α) =

E[Y ] if β + 1 < γ,
k
β
VaRα(X)
β+1−γ if β < γ ≤ β + 1,
{(1 + k)1/β − 1}VaRα(X) if β = γ.
(3.5)
Theorem 1 justifies the following relation:
∆ρX,Yα =
∫ 1
0
∆VaRX,Yu φα(u)du ∼
∫ 1
0
f¯(u)φα(u)du = M¯(α), α→ 1.
Note that condition [C3] is not required for Theorem 1 when β + 1 < γ. Moreover, when
β + 1 < γ, Theorem 1 implies that ∆ρX,Yα converges to E[Y ] as α → 1. The limit E[Y ] does
not depend on the forms of (φα)α, so this result is robust. The second main result is as follows.
Theorem 2. Assume [C1] and [C3]. Moreover, assume that
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[C4] X and Y have positive, continuous, and ultimately decreasing density functions fX and
fY , respectively, on [0,∞).
Under these assumptions, ρEulerα (Y |X+Y ) ∼ M¯(α)/δ as α→ 1, where δ is a positive constant
given by
δ =

1 if β + 1 < γ,
k/(E[Y ]β + kγ) if β + 1 = γ,
1/γ if β < γ < β + 1,
{1 + k − (1 + k)1−1/β}/k if β = γ.
(3.6)
Theorems 1 and 2 together imply that if X and Y are independent, and if FX and FY have
adequate density functions, then
∆ρX,Yα ∼ δρEulerα (Y |X + Y ), α→ 1. (3.7)
Note that δ is always smaller than or equal to 1, so that (3.7) is consistent with inequality
(3.3). In particular, if β + 1 < γ, then the asymptotic equivalence between the marginal risk
contribution ∆ρX,Yα and the Euler contribution ρ
Euler
α (Y |X+Y ) is justified (see (17.10) in [29]).
Note that ∆ρX,Yα is always larger than or equal to E[Y ] so long as the random vector
(X, Y ) satisfies a suitable technical condition, such as Assumption (S) in [27]. (Here, we
modify some conditions of the original version of Assumption (S) to facilitate focusing on
non-negative random variables.) Indeed, because ρα is a convex risk measure, the function
r(h) := ρα(X + hY ) is convex. Thus, we get
∆ρX,Yα = r(1)− r(0) ≥ r′(0) = E[Y ], (3.8)
where the last equality in the above relation is obtained from (see (5.12) in [27])
∂
∂h
VaRα(X + hY ) = E[Y |X + hY = VaRα(X + hY )] (3.9)
and
∂
∂h
∣∣∣
h=0
ρα(X + hY ) =
∫ 1
0
∂
∂h
∣∣∣
h=0
VaRu(X + hY )φα(u)du = E[Y ]
due to the dominated convergence theorem. Therefore, if β + 1 < γ, then
E[Y ] ≤ ∆ρX,Yα ∼ ρEulerα (Y |X + Y ) −→ E[Y ], α→ 1.
In Section 4, we numerically verify the above relation. Note that we can also verify a version
of Assumption (S) under [C4].
Remark 2.
(i) If FX is continuous, then FX(X) has a uniform distribution on (0, 1) (see, for instance,
Lemma A.21 in [17]). Therefore, M¯(α) with β < γ ≤ β + 1 is rewritten as
M¯(α) =
k
β
E
QXα [Xβ+1−γ],
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where E
QXα denotes the expectation operator with respect to the probability measure
QXα defined as
dQXα
dP
= φα(FX(X)). (3.10)
Note that we have ρα(X) = E
QXα [X], and so QXα represents the risk scenario that attains
the maximum in the following robust representation of ρα(X):
ρα(X) = max
Q∈Q E
Q[X],
where Q is a set of probability measures on (Ω,F). Also note that if ρα = ESα, then
QXα is given by
dQXα
dP
=
1
1− α1{X≥VaRα(X)},
and therefore
E
QXα [Xβ+1−γ] = E[Xβ+1−γ|X ≥ VaRα(X)].
Until the end of Remark 2, we assume that FX and FY are continuous.
(ii) In fact, we can relax the independence condition [C1] so that X may weakly depend
on Y within the negligible joint tail condition (see Remark A.1 in [20]). In this case,
under some additional assumptions such as [A5] and [A6] in [20], we can make the
same assertion as in Theorem 1, where the value E[Y ] in the definition (3.4) of M¯(α) is
replaced by E
QXα [Y ]. In particular, if β + 1 < γ, then
∆ρX,Yα ∼ EQ
X
α [Y ], α→ 1. (3.11)
Indeed, our proof in Appendix B also works by applying Theorem A.1 in [20] instead of
Theorem 4.1. Note that we need some additional condition to have that
lim inf
α→∞ E
QXα [Y ] > 0 (3.12)
(see Proposition 3 in Appendix B).
(iii) As mentioned in Appendix A.1 of [20], we can get another version of Theorem A.1
by switching the roles of X + Y and X and by imposing modified (though somewhat
artificial) mathematical conditions such as [A5’] and [A6’] in [20]. In particular, if
β + 1 < γ, we see that
∆VaRX,Yα ∼ E[Y |X + Y = VaRα(X + Y )], α→ 1 (3.13)
and then (by the same proof as Theorem 1 with (3.13))
∆ρX,Yα ∼ EQ
X+Y
α [Y ] = ρEulerα (Y |X + Y ), α→ 1 (3.14)
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under some assumptions. Here, QX+Yα is a probability measure defined by (3.10) with
replacing X by X + Y . If X and Y are independent (with natural assumptions on the
density functions), then (3.7) implies that (3.14) is also true. Here, note that the last
equality of (3.14) is obtained by (1.3), (3.9), and the dominated convergence theorem.
Indeed, we have
ρEulerα (Y |X + Y ) =
∫ 1
0
E[Y |X + Y = VaRu(X + Y )]φα(u)du = EQX+Yα [Y ] (3.15)
because FX+Y (X + Y ) is uniformly distributed on (0, 1). In Appendix A, we will show
that under some technical conditions that are more natural than both [A5]–[A6] and
[A5’]–[A6’] in [20], relations (3.11) and (3.14) simultaneously hold in the case β+ 1 < γ,
even if X and Y are dependent.
Note that if ρα = ESα, then
E
QX+Yα [Y ] = ESEulerα (Y |X + Y ) = E[Y |X + Y ≥ VaRα(X + Y )],
which is known as the component CVaR (also known as the CVaR contribution) and
widely used, particularly in the practice of credit portfolio risk management (see for
instance [1, 19, 24]).
4 Numerical analysis
In this section, we numerically investigate the behavior of ∆ρX,Yα . Throughout this section,
we assume that the distributions of X and Y are given as GPD(ξX , σX) and GPD(ξY , σY ),
respectively, with ξX , ξY ∈ (0, 1) and σX , σY > 0, where GPD(ξ, σ) denotes the generalized
Pareto distribution whose distribution function is given by 1− (1 + ξx/σ)−1/ξ, x ≥ 0. Then,
F¯X and F¯Y satisfy (3.1) with β = 1/ξX and γ = 1/ξY . Note that condition [C3] is satisfied
with
k =
(
σY
ξY
)1/ξY (σX
ξX
)−1/ξX
(see (5.2) in [20]). Also note that VaRα(X) and VaRα(Y ) are analytically solved as
VaRα(X) =
σX
ξX
{
(1− α)−ξX − 1} , VaRα(Y ) = σY
ξY
{
(1− α)−ξY − 1} .
We numerically compute ∆VaRX,Yα ,∆ES
X,Y
α ,∆ρ
EXP,X,Y
α ,∆ρ
POW,X,Y
α , and ES
Euler
α , where we let
ESEulerα = ES
Euler
α (Y |X + Y ) for brevity. In all calculations, we fix σX = 100 and σY = 80.
For ξX and ξY , we examine several patterns to study each of the following three cases: (i)
β + 1 < γ, (ii) β < γ ≤ β + 1, and (iii) β = γ.
Case (i) β + 1 < γ
We set ξX = 0.5 and ξY = 0.1. Hence, β = 2 and γ = 10, so that β + 1 < γ holds. Figure
1 shows the graphs of ∆ESX,Yα ,∆ρ
EXP,X,Y
α ,∆ρ
POW,X,Y
α , and ES
Euler
α . These values are always
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larger than E[Y ] whenever α ∈ (0, 1), and they converge to E[Y ] for both α → 0 and α → 1.
Indeed,
lim
α→0
∆ρX,Yα = E[X + Y ]− E[X] = E[Y ] (4.1)
holds because φESα (u), φ
EXP
α (u), φ
POW
α (u) −→ 1, α→ 0 for each u ∈ [0, 1). The limit as α→ 1
is a consequence of Theorem 1. Moreover, the forms of these graphs are unimodal. That is,
the function α → ∆ρX,Yα incereases on (0, α0) and decreases on (α0, 1) for some α0 ∈ (0, 1).
Intuitively, the values of ∆ρX,Yα seem to become large as α increases because a larger α implies
a greater risk sensitivity. However, our result implies that the impact of adding loss variable
Y into the prior risk profile X is maximized at some α0 < 1.
Figure 2 shows the relation between ∆ESX,Yα and ∆VaR
X,Y
α . We see that ∆ES
X,Y
α takes a
maximum at α = α0, where α0 is a solution to
∆VaRX,Yα0 = ∆ES
X,Y
α0
. (4.2)
Indeed, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. If there is a unique solution α0 ∈ (0, 1) to (4.2), then max
0<α<1
∆ESX,Yα =
∆ESX,Yα0 .
Note that unlike the case of SRMs, ∆VaRX,Yα takes a value smaller than E[Y ] if α is small.
This is because VaR is not a convex risk measure, so the relation (3.8) is not guaranteed for
ρα = VaRα. In particular, we observe that
lim
α→0
∆VaRX,Yα = essinf(X + Y )− essinf X = 0. (4.3)
Case (ii) β < γ ≤ β + 1
Figure 3 shows the approximation errors, defined as
Errorα =
M¯(α)
∆ρX,Yα
− 1 (4.4)
with ξX = 2/3 (β = 1.5) and ξY = 0.5 (γ = 2). We see that Errorα is close to 0 as α→ 1 for
each case of ρα = ESα, ρ
EXP
α , ρ
POW
α . Moreover, we numerically verify the assertion of Theorem
2 for ρα = ESα in Figure 4. We observe that M¯α/ES
Euler
α converges to δ = 1/γ = ξY = 0.5 as
α→ 1.
By contrast, the convergence speed of Errorα as α → 1 decreases if the tails of X and Y
are less fat-tailed. Figure 5 shows Errorα with ξX = 2/7 (β = 3.5) and ξY = 0.25 (γ = 4).
We find that Errorα decreases as α tends to 1, but the gap between Errorα and 0 is still large,
even in the case α = 0.999.
Case (iii) β = γ
Finally, we look at the case ξX = ξY = 0.7. The results are summarized in Figures 6 and
7. We see that Errorα approaches 0 as α→ 1 for each case of ρα = ESα, ρEXPα , ρPOWα . We also
confirm that M¯(α)/ESEulerα converges to δ = {1 + k − (1 + k)1−1/β}/k ≈ 0.870 as α→ 1.
Similarly to Case (ii), the convergence speed of Errorα decreases as the tails of X and Y
become thinner. Figure 8 shows the graph of Errorα with ξX = ξY = 0.3. The approximation
error tends to zero as α→ 1, but remains smaller than −20% even when α = 0.999.
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5 Conluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied the asymptotic behavior of the difference between ρα(X+Y )
and ρα(X) as α → 1 when ρα is a parameterized SRM satisfying (1.2). We have shown that
∆ρX,Yα is asymptotically equivalent to M¯(α) given by (3.4), whose form changes according to
the relative magnitudes of the thicknesses of the tails of X and Y . In particular, for β+1 < γ,
we found the convergence lim
α→1
∆ρX,Yα = E[Y ] for general CLBSRMs (ρα)α. Moreover, we also
found that ∆ρX,Yα ∼ δρEulerα (Y |X + Y ) as α → 1 for a constant δ ∈ (0, 1] given by (3.6).
This clarifies the asymptotic relation between the marginal risk contribution and the Euler
contribution.
Our numerical results in the case β + 1 < γ showed that ∆ρX,Yα is not increasing but is
unimodal with respect to α, which implies that the impact of Y in the portfolio X + Y does
not always increase with α. Interestingly, this phenomenon is inconsistent with intuition.
Our results essentially depend on the assumption that X and Y are independent. However,
the dependence structure of the loss variables X and Y plays an essential role in financial risk
management. The case of dependent X and Y for ρα = VaRα has already been studied in
Section A.1 of [20]. As mentioned in Remark 2, we have now generalized this result to the
case of CLBSRMs. However, we require the somewhat strong assumption that X and Y are
not strongly dependent on each other. With the additional analysis in Appendix A below, we
will see that our main results still hold for a general dependence structure if β + 1 < γ, but
that they are easily violated if β ≤ γ ≤ β + 1. In future work, we will continue to study the
asymptotic behavior of ∆ρX,Yα as α→ 1, without the independence condition.
A A short consideration of the dependent case
Here, we briefly investigate the asymptotic behavior of ∆ρX,Yα as α→ 1 when X and Y are
not independent. Throughout this section, we assume that FX , FY , and FX+Y are continuous.
With this, (3.8) is rewritten as ∆ρX,Yα ≥ EQ
X
α [Y ]. Combining this result with (3.3), we have
E
QXα [Y ] ≤ ∆ρX,Yα ≤ EQ
X+Y
α [Y ]. (A.1)
Note that (A.1) holds for general SRM ρα whenever (3.9) holds.
A.1 Comonotonic case
We consider the case where X and Y are comonotone. In other words, they are perfectly
positively dependent (see Definition 4.82 of [17] and Definition 5.15 in [22]). In this case, the
following proposition is straightforwardly shown.
Proposition 2. If X and Y are comonotone, then
∆ρX,Yα = E
QXα [Y ] = E
QX+Yα [Y ] = ρα(Y ). (A.2)
This proposition implies that when β + 1 < γ, the asymptotic relations (3.11) and (3.14)
still hold, even if X and Y are strongly correlated, but that the assertions of Theorems 1 and
2 do not necessarily hold when β ≤ γ ≤ β + 1.
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A.2 Additional numerical analysis
Similarly to Section 4, we assume that X ∼ GPD(ξX , σX) and Y ∼ GPD(ξY , σY ) with
σX = 100, σY = 80. To describe the dependence between X and Y , we introduce a copula.
By Sklar’s theorem, we see that the joint distribution function F(X,Y )(x, y) = P (X ≤ x, Y ≤ y)
of the random vector (X, Y ) is represented by
F(X,Y )(x, y) = C(FX(x), FY (y)),
for a copula C : [0, 1]2 −→ [0, 1], which is a distribution function with uniform marginals.
Here, we examine the following three copulas:
(a) The Gaussian copula CGaussρ (u, v) = Φ(Φ
−1(u),Φ−1(v)), −1 < ρ < 1,
(b) The Gumbel copula CGumbelθ (u, v) = exp
(−((− log u)θ + (− log v)θ)1/θ), θ ≥ 1,
(c) The countermonotonic copula Ccmon(u, v) = max{u+ v − 1, 0},
where Φ(x) =
∫ x
−∞
e−y
2/2/
√
2pidy is the distribution function of the standard normal distri-
bution (for more details on the copulas, see, for instance, Chapter 5 of [22]). The parameters
ρ in (a) and θ in (b) describe the strength of the dependence between X and Y . We always
set ρ = 0.3 and θ = 3 in this section. If C = Ccmon, then X and Y are perfectly nega-
tively dependent. In particular, in that case, X and Y are represented as X = F−1X (U) and
Y = F−1Y (1− U), where U is a random variable with uniform distribution on (0, 1).
Figure 9 summarizes the results with ξX = 0.5 and ξY = 0.1. We compare the values
of ∆ρX,Yα (with ρα = ESα, ρ
EXP
α , ρ
POW
α ) and ES
Euler
α (Y |X + Y ). We find that all these values
converge to the same value, which is not equal to E[Y ], by letting α→ 1. Note that when X
and Y are countermonotonic, they converge to zero as α→ 1, so (3.12) does not hold in this
case.
Figure 10 shows the graphs of the relative errors defined by (4.4) with ρα = ESα, ρ
EXP
α , ρ
POW
α
when we set ξX = 2/3 and ξY = 0.5. We find that Errorα does not converge to zero as α→ 1.
Similar phenomena are observed in Figure 11 with the settings ξX = ξY = 0.7. Therefore, the
assertion of Theorem 1 does not hold when β ≤ γ ≤ β + 1 if X and Y are correlated.
Note that the above findings are consistent with the comonotonic case (Proposition 2).
A.3 Theoretical result in the case β + 1 < γ
We describe the following conditions.
[C5] For each y ≥ 0, FX(·|Y = y) has a positive, non-increasing density function fX(·|Y = y)
on [0,∞), where FX(·|Y = y) is the conditional distribution function of X given Y = y.
Moreover, fX(x|Y = y) is continuous in x and y.
[C6] There is a κ ∈ R such that fX(x|Y = y) is uniformly regularly varying with index κ in
the following sense:
sup
y≥0
∣∣∣∣fX(tx|Y = y)fX(x|Y = y) − tκ
∣∣∣∣ −→ 0, x→∞ (A.3)
for each t > 0. Moreover, fX+Y is regularly varying.
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[C7] It holds that
sup
x≥0
E[Y
η|X = x] + sup
z≥0
E[Y
η|X + Y = z] <∞ (A.4)
for some η > max{−κ− β, 1}.
Conditions [C5]–[C7] strongly correspond to conditions [A5]–[A6] in [20]. It should be
noted that the index parameter κ is assumed to be equal to −β − 1 in condition [A6] in [20],
but that this equality is not required to obtain our results. Note also that κ may be different
from −β − 1. Indeed, we can verify, at least numerically, that for each y ≥ 0, the function
fX(·|Y = y) is regularly varying with index κ = −1 − β/(1 − ρ2) (resp., κ = −θβ − 1) if
we adopt C = CGaussρ (resp., C = C
Gumbel
θ ) as a copula for the random vector (X, Y ) whose
marginal distributions are given by the generalized Pareto distribution.
Using a similar argument as in the proof of the uniform convergence theorem (Theorem
1.2.1 in [10]), together with the continuity of fX(x|Y = y) in y, we get from (A.3) that
sup
t∈K
sup
y≥0
∣∣∣∣fX(tx|Y = y)fX(x|Y = y) − tκ
∣∣∣∣ −→ 0, x→∞, (A.5)
for each compact set K ⊂ (0,∞).
We now introduce the following result.
Theorem 3. Assume [C5]–[C7] and (3.12). If β + 1 < γ, it holds that
E
QXα [Y ] ∼ ∆ρX,Yα ∼ EQ
X+Y
α [Y ], α→ 1.
This theorem claims that both (3.11) and (3.14) are true under some conditions, even when
X and Y are dependent.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume (2.5). Fix any u ∈ [0, 1). Then, (2.5) implies that
lim
α→1
∫ (1+u)/2
u
φα(v)dv = 0. (B.1)
Because φα is non-decreasing and non-negative, we see that∫ (1+u)/2
u
φα(v)dv ≥ 1− u
2
φα(u) ≥ 0. (B.2)
Combining (B.1) with (B.2), we have lim
α→0
φα(u) = 0.
Conversely, if we assume (2.6), then Prokhorov’s theorem implies that for each increasing
sequence (αn)n≥1 ⊂ (0, 1) with lim
n
αn = 1 there is a further subsequence (αnk)k≥1 and a
probability measure µ on [0, 1] such that Φαnk weakly converges to µ as k → ∞. Then, for
each β ∈ (0, 1), we see that
0 ≤ µ([0, β)) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
∫ β
0
φαnk (u)du ≤ lim infk→∞ βφαnk (β) = 0.
This immediately leads us to µ([0, 1)) = 0, hence µ = δ1. We therefore arrive at (2.5). 
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Proof of Proposition 1. Let f(α) = ∆ESX,Yα . We observe that
f ′(α) =
1
(1− α)2
∫ 1
α
∆VaRX,Yu du−
1
1− α∆VaR
X,Y
α =
g(α)
1− α,
where g(α) = ∆ESX,Yα −∆VaRX,Yα . By (4.1), (4.3), and Theorem 1, we see that g is continuous
on (0, 1), g(0+) = E[Y ] > 0 and g(1−) = 0. Moreover, by the assumption, it holds that
g(α0) = 0 and g(α) 6= 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1) \ {α0}. Together, these imply that g is positive
on (0, α0) and negative on (α0, 1), and that f
′ has the same pattern. Therefore, f(α) takes a
maximum at α = α0. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Because ρα is comonotonic, we obviously have
∆ρX,Yα = ρα(X) + ρα(Y )− ρα(X) = ρα(Y ).
Here, we see that X = F−1X (U) and Y = F
−1
Y (U) for some random variable U with uniform
distribution on (0, 1) (see Lemmas 4.89–4.90 in [17] and their proofs). Then we have
E[Y |X = VaRα(X)] = F−1Y (α) = VaRα(Y ),
and thus
E
QXα [Y ] =
∫ 1
0
VaRu(Y )φα(u)du = ρα(Y ).
Similarly, because F−1X+Y = F
−1
X + F
−1
Y , we have
E[Y |X + Y = VaRα(X + Y )] = VaRα(Y ),
and E
QX+Yα [Y ] = ρα(Y ), which completes the proof. 
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We first state some propositions and prove them. For this, let f¯ be given as (3.5). Note
again that M¯ defined in (3.4) satisfies
M¯(α) =
∫ 1
0
f¯(u)φα(u)du.
Proposition 3. lim inf
α→1
M¯(α) > 0.
Proof. If β+1 < γ, we see that f¯(α) = E[Y ] > 0 because Y is non-negative and F¯Y is positive.
If β < γ ≤ β + 1, we observe
M¯(α) ≥ k
β
∫ 1
α0
VaRu(X)
β+1−γφα(u)du,
≥ k
β
VaRα0(X)
β+1−γ
(
1−
∫ α0
0
φα(u)du
)
,
−→ k
β
VaRα0(X)
β+1−γ > 0, α→ 1,
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where α0 ∈ (0, 1) is a real number satisfying VaRα0(X) > 0. The existence of such an α0 can
be proven using Propositions 1.5.1 and 1.5.15 in [10]. Similarly, if β = γ, we have
lim inf
α→1
M¯(α) ≥ {(1 + k)1/β − 1}VaRα0(X) > 0. 
Proposition 4. 0 ≤
∫ 1
0
f¯(u)du <∞.
Proof. If β + 1 < γ, the assertion is obvious from the assumption β > 1. If β < γ ≤ β + 1, we
see that
0 ≤
∫ 1
0
f¯(u)du =
k
β
E[X
β+1−γ] ≤ k
β
E[X]
β+1−γ <∞,
because of 0 < β + 1− γ < 1. If β = γ, we have
0 ≤
∫ 1
0
f¯(u)du = {(1 + k)1/β − 1}E[X] <∞. 
Corollary 1. M¯(α) <∞, α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. This follows from (3.2) and Proposition 4. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let f(α) = ∆VaRX,Yα , α ∈ (0, 1). Note that
lim
α→1
f(α)
f¯(α)
= 1, (B.3)
by virtue of Theorem 4.1(i)–(iii) in [20]. Moreover, (B.3) immediately implies
lim
α→1
sup
u∈[α,1)
∣∣∣∣f(u)f¯(u) − 1
∣∣∣∣ = 0. (B.4)
Furthermore, it holds that∫ 1
0
f(u)du =
∫ 1
0
VaRu(X + Y )du−
∫ 1
0
VaRu(X)du = E[X + Y ]− E[X] = E[Y ] <∞, (B.5)
hence f is integrable. The integrability of f¯ is guaranteed by Proposition 4.
Temporarily fix any δ ∈ (0, 1). From (2.6) and (B.5), we easily see that
(0 ≤)
∫ δ
0
f(u)φα(u)du ≤ φα(δ)
∫ 1
0
f(u)du −→ 0, α→ 1. (B.6)
Similarly, we have
lim
α→1
∫ δ
0
f¯(u)φα(u)du = 0. (B.7)
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Additionally, we have ∫ 1
δ
f(u)φα(u)du
M¯(α)
=
∫ 1
δ
f(u)
f¯(u)
ψα(u)du, (B.8)
where ψα(u) = f¯(u)φα(u)/M¯(α). Using (B.7) and Proposition 3, we obtain∫ 1
δ
ψα(u)du = 1− 1
M¯(α)
∫ δ
0
f¯(u)φα(u)du −→ 1, α→ 1. (B.9)
By (B.8) and (B.9), we have∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
δ
f(u)φα(u)du
M¯(α)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
δ
(
f(u)
f¯(u)
− 1
)
ψα(u)du
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∫ 1
δ
ψα(u)du− 1
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
u∈[δ,1)
∣∣∣∣f(u)f¯(u) − 1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∫ 1
δ
ψα(u)du− 1
∣∣∣∣ −→ sup
u∈[δ,1)
∣∣∣∣f(u)f¯(u) − 1
∣∣∣∣ , α→ 1.
Combining this with (B.6) and Proposition 3, we arrive at
lim sup
α→1
∣∣∣∣∆ρX,YαM¯(α) − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
u∈[δ,1)
∣∣∣∣f(u)f¯(u) − 1
∣∣∣∣ .
Because δ ∈ (0, 1) is arbitrary, we obtain the desired assertion by (B.4). 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Let Z = X + Y for brevity. We see that Z has a density function
fZ(z) =
∫ z
0
fX(z − y)fY (y)dy =
∫ z
0
fX(x)fY (z − x)dx.
Lemma 2. fZ is positive and continuous on (0,∞). Moreover, fZ is regularly varying with
index −min{β, γ} − 1 and it holds that
lim
z→∞
zfZ(z)
F¯Z(z)
= min{β, γ}. (B.10)
Proof. Continuity and positivity are obvious. By [C4] and Theorem 1.1 in [9], we see that
fZ(z) ∼ fX(z) +fY (z), z →∞ and that fZ is regularly varying with index max{−β−1,−γ−
1} = −min{β, γ} − 1. The last assertion is obtained by Proposition 1.5.10 in [10]. 
Let FY (·|Z = z) be the conditional distribution function of Y given Z = z. Then we have
E[Y |Z = z] =
∫ ∞
0
yFY (dy|Z = z). (B.11)
Proposition 5. It holds that
FY (y|Z = z) =
∫ y∧z
0
fX(z − y′)
fZ(z)
fY (y
′)dy′, y, z ≥ 0.
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Proof. For each y, z ≥ 0, a straightforward calculation gives∫ z
0
∫ y∧z′
0
fX(z
′ − y′)
fZ(z′)
fY (y
′)dy′fZ(z′)dz′ = P (Y ≤ y, Z ≤ z),
which implies our assertion. 
Note that (B.11) and Proposition 5 lead to
E[Y |Z = z] =
∫ z
0
y
fX(z − y)
fZ(z)
fY (y)dy. (B.12)
Proposition 6. If β + 1 < γ, then
E[Y |Z = VaRα(Z)] −→ E[Y ], α→ 1.
Proof. Let
zα = VaRα(Z), (B.13)
Gα(y) = y
fX(zα − y)
fZ(zα)
1[0,zα/2](y), (B.14)
Hα(x) = (zα − x)fY (zα − x)
fZ(zα)
1[0,zα/2)(x). (B.15)
Then, we see that
E[Gα(Y )] + E[Hα(X)] =
(∫ zα/2
0
+
∫ zα
zα/2
)
y
fX(zα − y)
fZ(zα)
fY (y)dy = E[Y |Z = zα]. (B.16)
Therefore, we need to show that
E[Gα(Y )] −→ E[Y ], E[Hα(X)] −→ 0, α→ 1. (B.17)
First, we show that
Gα(y) −→ y, Hα(x) −→ 0, α→ 1 for each x, y ≥ 0. (B.18)
Using (B.10), Lemmas A.1 and A.3 in [20], and Proposition A3.8 in [16], we obtain
fX(zα − y)
fZ(zα)
=
fX(zα − y)
fX(zα)
· zαfX(zα)
F¯X(zα)
· F¯X(zα)
F¯Z(zα)
· F¯Z(zα)
zαfZ(zα)
−→ 1 · β · 1 · 1
β
= 1, α→ 1.
Furthermore, we observe that
0 ≤ Hα(x) ≤ zαfY (zα/2)
fZ(zα)
, (B.19)
and that the function z 7→ zfY (z/2)/fZ(z) is regulary varying with index β+1−γ < 0. Thus,
we obtain
zαfY (zα/2)
fZ(zα)
−→ 0, α→ 1.
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Now, (B.18) is obvious.
Next, we observe that
0 ≤ Gα(Y ) +Hα(X) ≤ Y fX(zα/2)
fZ(zα)
+
zαfY (zα/2)
fZ(zα)
.
Because (fX(zα/2)/fZ(zα))α and (zαfY (zα/2)/fZ(zα))α are convergent (as α → 1), they are
bounded. Thus, we have
0 ≤ Gα(Y ) +Hα(X) ≤ C(Y + 1) (B.20)
for some C > 0. By (B.18) and (B.20), we can apply the dominated convergence theorem to
obtain (B.17). 
Proposition 7. If β + 1 = γ, then
E[Y |Z = VaRα(Z)] −→ E[Y ] + kγ
β
, α→ 1.
Proof. Let zα, Gα(y), and Hα(x) be the same as in (B.13)–(B.15). First, we have E[Gα(Y )] −→
E[Y ], α→ 1 by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 6. Next, for each x ≥ 0, we
see that
Hα(x) =
(zα − x)fY (zα − x)
F¯Y (zα − x) ·
F¯Y (zα − x)
F¯Y (zα)
· zαF¯Y (zα)
F¯X(zα)
× F¯X(zα)
F¯Z(zα)
· F¯Z(zα)
zαfZ(zα)
1[0,zα/2)(x)
−→ γ · 1 · k · 1 · 1
β
· 1 = kγ
β
, α→ 1
due to [C3], (B.10), Proposition A3.8 in [16], Proposition 3.1(i) in [20], and Lemmas A.1 and
A.3 in [20]. Moreover, we have (B.19), and the right-hand side of this inequality converges to
2γ+1kγ/β as α → 1, and so it is bounded. Therefore, we apply the dominated convergence
theorem to obtain E[Hα(X)] −→ kγ/β as α→ 1. We complete the proof by combining these
with (B.16). 
Proposition 8. If β < γ < β + 1, we have
E[Y |Z = VaRα(Z)] ∼ kβ
γ
VaRα(X)
β+1−γ, α→ 1.
Proof. Let zα, Gα(y) and Hα(x) be set as earlier. Similarly to the proof of Propositions 6 and
7, we get E[Gα(Y )] −→ E[Y ], α→ 1. This implies that E[Gα(Y )]/xβ+1−γα −→ 0, α→ 1, where
xα = VaRα(X). Therefore, it suffices to show that E[Hα(X)]/x
β+1−γ
α −→ kβ/γ as α → 1,
which is easy to see by using similar calculations as in the proof of Proposition 7 and by using
Proposition 3.1(i) in [20]. 
Proposition 9. If β = γ, then
E[Y |Z = VaRα(Z)] ∼ k(1 + k)−1+1/βVaRα(X), α→ 1.
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Proof. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 8, we need to show only that
E[H˜α(X)] −→ k(1 + k)−1+1/β, α→ 1, (B.21)
where H˜α(x) = Hα(x)/xα. Note that Lemmas A.1 and A.2 in [20] imply F¯Z(x) ∼ F¯X(x) +
F¯Y (x) ∼ (1 + k)F¯X(x) ∼ (k−1 + 1)F¯Y (x), x → ∞ and zα ∼ (1 + k)1/βxα, α → 1. Therefore,
for each x ≥ 0, we observe
H˜α(x) =
zα
xα
· (zα − x)fY (zα − x)
F¯Y (zα − x) ·
F¯Y (zα − x)
F¯Y (zα)
· F¯Y (zα)
F¯Z(zα)
· F¯Z(zα)
zαfZ(zα)
1[0,zα/2)(x)
−→ (1 + k)1/β · β · 1 · k
1 + k
· 1
β
· 1 = k(1 + k)−1+1/β, α→ 1
by [C3], (B.10), Proposition A3.8 in [16], and Lemma A.3 in [20]. Moreover, we have
0 ≤ H˜α(x) ≤ zα
xα
fY (zα/2)
fZ(zα)
−→ 2γ+1k(1 + k)−1+1/β, α→ 1,
and thus we obtain (B.21) by applying the dominated convergence theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We can verify that the random vector (X, Y ) satisfies (a version of)
Assumption (S) in [27] by using a standard argument. Therefore, (3.9) is true from (5.13)
in [27]. Additionally, using Propositions 6–9, we see that for each ε > 0, there is an α0 ∈ (0, 1)
such that ∣∣∣∣δg¯(α)f¯(α) − 1
∣∣∣∣ < ε, α ∈ [α0, 1), (B.22)
where we denote g¯(α) = E[Y |Z = VaRα(Z)]. Moreover, it is easy to see that f¯ and g¯ are
bounded on [0, α0]. Therefore, combining (3.9), (3.15), and (B.22), we get∣∣∣∣δρEulerα (Y |Z)M¯(α) − 1
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
M¯(α)
{(
δ sup
u∈[0,α0]
g¯(u) + sup
u∈[0,α0]
f¯(u)
)∫ α0
0
φα(u)du+ ε
∫ 1
α0
f¯(u)φα(u)du
}
−→ ε
δ0
, α→ 1,
where δ0 = lim inf
α→1
M¯(α), which is positive due to Proposition 3. Because ε > 0 is arbitrary,
we obtain the desired assertion. 
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
First, note that condition [C5] immediately implies [C2] with x0 = 0 and
fX(x) =
∫ ∞
0
fX(x|Y = y)FY (dy).
20
Second, note that by [C6], Proposition 3.1(i) in [20] (see also Remark 3.2 therein) and Propo-
sition A3.8 in [16], we have (B.10) and
fX(x) ∼ fZ(x), x→∞. (B.23)
To prove Theorem 3, we give the following three propositions.
Proposition 10. VaRα(X + uY ) is continuously differentiable in u ∈ [0, 1] and it holds that
∂
∂u
VaRα(X + uY ) = E[Y |X + uY = VaRα(X + uY )], 0 ≤ u ≤ 1.
Proposition 10 is obtained by an argument similar to the proof of Lemma 5.3 in [27], using
the implicit function theorem.
Proposition 11. The function x 7→ E[Y |X = x] is regularly varying with index κ+ β + 1.
Proof. Fix any t > 0. We observe that∣∣E[Y |X = tx]− tκ+β+1 E[Y |X = x]∣∣
≤
∫ ∞
0
y
fX(x|Y = y)
fX(x)
∣∣∣∣fX(tx|Y = y)fX(x|Y = y) · fX(x)fX(tx) − tκ+β+1
∣∣∣∣FY (dy),
≤
{
sup
x≥0
fX(x)
fX(tx)
sup
y≥0
∣∣∣∣fX(tx|Y = y)fX(x|Y = y) − tκ
∣∣∣∣+ tκ ∣∣∣∣ fX(x)fX(tx) − tβ+1
∣∣∣∣}E[Y |X = x],
and therefore, using [C5], we arrive at
lim
x→∞
∣∣∣∣E[Y |X = tx]E[Y |X = x] − tκ+β+1
∣∣∣∣ = 0.

Proposition 12. E[Y |X = x] ∼ E[Y |X + Y = x], x→∞.
Proof. Fix any ε > 0. Then we have
|E[Y |Z = x]− E[Y |X = x]| ≤ Aε(x) +Bε(x),
where we denote Z = X + Y and
Aε(x) =
∫ εx
0
y
∣∣∣∣fX(x− y|Y = y)fZ(x) − fX(x|Y = y)fX(x)
∣∣∣∣FY (dy),
Bε(x) = E[Y 1{Y >εx}|Z = x] + E[Y 1{Y >εx}|X = x].
By [C7] and the Chebyshev inequality, we get
0 ≤ B
ε(x)
E[Y |X = x] ≤
C
εη−1xη−1 E[Y |X = x] , (B.24)
for some C > 0. Because Proposition 11 tells us that x 7→ xη−1 E[Y |X = x] is regularly
varying with index η + κ + β > 0, the right-hand side of (B.24) converges to zero as x → ∞
(see Proposition 1.5.1 in [10]).
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Moreover, we see that
Aε(x) ≤
∫ εx
0
y
fX(x|Y = y)
fX(x)
∣∣∣∣fX(x− y|Y = y)fX(x|Y = y) · fX(x)fZ(x) − 1
∣∣∣∣FY (dy)
=
∫ ε
0
ux
fX(x|Y = ux)
fX(x)
∣∣∣∣fX((1− u)x|Y = ux)fX(x|Y = ux) · fX(x)fZ(x) − 1
∣∣∣∣FY/x(du), x > 0.
Here, we observe that∣∣∣∣fX((1− u)x|Y = ux)fX(x|Y = ux) · fX(x)fZ(x) − 1
∣∣∣∣
≤ |1− (1− u)κ|+ (1− u)κ
∣∣∣∣fX(x)fZ(x) − 1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣fX((1− u)x|Y = ux)fX(x|Y = ux) − (1− u)κ
∣∣∣∣ fX(x)fZ(x) ,
for each u ∈ [0, ε]. Note that if κ ≥ 0 (resp., κ < 0), we have (1 − ε)κ ≤ (1− u)κ ≤ 1 (resp.,
1 ≤ (1− u)κ ≤ (1− ε)κ). Moreover, by (B.23), fX(x)/fZ(x) converges to 1 as x→∞, and so
it is bounded. Therefore, we get
Aε(x) ≤ E[Y |X = x]
{
|1− (1− ε)κ|+ max{1, (1− ε)κ}
∣∣∣∣fX(x)fZ(x) − 1
∣∣∣∣
+C ′ sup
1−ε≤t≤1
sup
y≥0
∣∣∣∣fX(tx|Y = y)fX(x|Y = y) − tκ
∣∣∣∣
}
,
for some C ′ > 0.
Now we arrive at
lim sup
x→∞
∣∣∣∣E[Y |Z = x]E[Y |X = x] − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |1− (1− ε)κ|
by using (A.5) and (B.23). Because ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain the desired assertion. 
Proof of Theorem 3. First, note that Proposition 10 guarantees that
E
QXα [Y ] =
∫ 1
0
E[Y |X = xu]φα(u)du, EQX+Yα [Y ] =
∫ 1
0
E[Y |X + Y = zu]φα(u)du,
where xu = VaRu(X) and zu = VaRu(X + Y ).
Then, fix any ε > 0. By Propositions 11–12 and Lemma A.3 in [20], we see that
E[Y |X = xα] ∼ E[Y |X = zα] ∼ E[Y |X + Y = zα], α→ 1,
Thus, there is an α0 ∈ (0, 1) such that∣∣∣∣E[Y |X + Y = zα]E[Y |X = xα] − 1
∣∣∣∣ < ε, α ∈ [α0, 1).
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Therefore, we have∣∣∣∣∣EQ
X+Y
α [Y ]
EQ
X
α [Y ]
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1EQXα [Y ]
∫ 1
0
|E[Y |X + Y = zu]− E[Y |X = xu]|φα(u)du
≤ 1
EQ
X
α [Y ]
∫ α0
0
{E[Y |X + Y = zu] + E[Y |X = xu]}φα(u)du+ ε
−→ ε, α→ 1
by virtue of (3.12). Because ε > 0 is arbitrary, we get that E
QXα [Y ] ∼ EQX+Yα [Y ], α → 1.
Combining this result with (A.1), we obtain the desired assertion. 
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Figure 1: Graphs of ∆ESX,Yα (blue), ∆ρ
EXP,X,Y
α (orange), ∆ρ
POW,X,Y
α (green) and
ESEulerα (Y |X + Y ) (black, dashed) with ξX = 0.5 and ξY = 0.1. The red solid line shows
E[Y ]. The horizontal axis corresponds to α.
Figure 2: Graphs of ∆ESX,Yα (blue) and ∆VaR
X,Y
α (brown, dashed) with ξX = 0.5 and ξY = 0.1.
The red solid line shows E[Y ]. The horizontal axis corresponds to α.
26
Figure 3: Approximation errors defined by (4.4) with ξX = 2/3 and ξY = 0.5 . Blue line:
ρα = ESα. Orange line: ρα = ρ
EXP
α . Green line: ρα = ρ
POW
α . The horizontal axis corresponds
to α.
Figure 4: M¯(α)/ESEulerα (blue) and δ = 1/γ = ξY (red). We set ξX = 2/3 and ξY = 0.5. The
horizontal axis corresponds to α.
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Figure 5: Approximation errors defined by (4.4) with ξX = 2/7 and ξY = 0.25. Blue line:
ρα = ESα. Orange line: ρα = ρ
EXP
α . Green line: ρα = ρ
POW
α . The horizontal axis corresponds
to α.
Figure 6: Approximation errors defined by (4.4) with ξX = ξY = 0.7. Blue line: ρα = ESα.
Orange line: ρα = ρ
EXP
α . Green line: ρα = ρ
POW
α . The horizontal axis corresponds to α.
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Figure 7: M¯(α)/ESEulerα (blue) and δ = {1 + k− (1 + k)1−1/β}/k (red). We set ξX = ξY = 0.7.
The horizontal axis corresponds to α.
Figure 8: Approximation errors defined by (4.4) with ξX = ξY = 0.3. Blue line: ρα = ESα.
Orange line: ρα = ρ
EXP
α . Green line: ρα = ρ
POW
α . The horizontal axis corresponds to α.
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Figure 9: Graphs of ∆ESX,Yα (blue), ∆ρ
EXP,X,Y
α (orange), ∆ρ
POW,X,Y
α (green) and
ESEulerα (Y |X + Y ) (black, dashed) with ξX = 0.5 and ξY = 0.1. The red solid line shows E[Y ].
The horizontal axis corresponds to α. Left: C = CGaussρ with ρ = 0.3. Center: C = C
Gumbel
θ
with θ = 3. Right: C = Ccmon.
Figure 10: Approximation errors defined by (4.4) with ξX = 2/3 and ξY = 0.5. Blue line:
ρα = ESα. Orange line: ρα = ρ
EXP
α . Green line: ρα = ρ
POW
α . The horizontal axis corresponds
to α. Left: C = CGaussρ with ρ = 0.3. Center: C = C
Gumbel
θ with θ = 3. Right: C = C
cmon.
Figure 11: Approximation errors defined by (4.4) with ξX = ξY = 0.7. Blue line: ρα = ESα.
Orange line: ρα = ρ
EXP
α . Green line: ρα = ρ
POW
α . The horizontal axis corresponds to α. Left:
C = CGaussρ with ρ = 0.3. Center: C = C
Gumbel
θ with θ = 3. Right: C = C
cmon.
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